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Three Years Under the PIPEDA:
A Disappointing Beginning 
By Christopher Berzins†
the Federal Court level. There have also been publicIntroduction 
statements from the Commissioner’s office with respect
to policy directions and compliance issues, and the emer-s of January 1, 2004, after a three-year phase-in
gence of some critical commentary concerning oversightA period, the Personal Information Protection and
and enforcement issues. 11 Therefore, even allowing forElectronic Documents Act1 (PIPEDA) came fully into
the uncertainties already noted, there is now enoughforce. Although considerable uncertainty currently
experience with administration of the legislation toprevails due to unanticipated events such as the resigna-
permit a reassessment of my previous criticisms.tion and replacement of Commissioner George
Radwanski 2 and the late constitutional challenge by Unfortunately, developments thus far appear to
Quebec, 3 there is now sufficient experience with the confirm the concerns I expressed about the weaknesses
legislation to begin to assess how the PIPEDA is working. of the PIPEDA’s oversight and enforcement mechanisms.
It is also a timely juncture to do so with the extension of The PIPEDA’s emphasis on complaint resolution has
the legislation to the provincially regulated private been clearly borne out in practice with little in the way
sector. 4 of systemic and proactive approaches to privacy compli-
ance. In addition, very few complaints have made it toSeveral years ago I strongly criticized the oversight
the Federal Court, and those that have been filed haveand enforcement approach that underpins the PIPEDA.5
moved extremely slowly, the result being that there isMy criticisms were two-fold. First, I argued that the
very little sense of how the courts will shape the legisla-PIPEDA placed excessive reliance on complaint resolu-
tion. Not only does this create tremendous uncertainty,tion as a means of protecting personal information, and
but it suggests that delay may become a fundamentalthat for a number of reasons, this might not be the most
aspect of the compliance environment, to the obviouseffective means of achieving regulatory compliance, par-
detriment of complainants.ticularly in a privacy context. Second, I suggested that the
Privacy Commissioner and the Federal Court were par- The experience over the first three years suggests
ticularly weak choices as the primary institutions respon- that there are at least four fundamental problems with
sible for oversight and enforcement: the former by oversight and enforcement of the PIPEDA. First is the
nature an ombudsman limited to the power to make heavy emphasis on complaint resolution. Not only are
recommendations, and the latter a generalist body with there serious questions about the effectiveness of com-
no claim to privacy expertise. I argued that these short- plaint investigations as a tool for promoting privacy com-
comings, along with the cost and delay inherent in the pliance, but it appears that complaint resolution within
mandatory two-step process that requires complainants the PIPEDA framework is making cost, delay, and uncer-
to go first to the Commissioner and then to the courts, 6 tainty significant considerations for all parties. Second,
could undermine privacy protection by frustrating com- the Privacy Commissioner’s office has neglected to utilise
plainants and rewarding non-compliance. those provisions in the PIPEDA that promote proactive
The criticisms I advanced were based primarily on a and systemic approaches to privacy compliance, thereby
critique of the policy process that produced the PIPEDA7 failing to employ the entire ‘‘privacy toolkit’’. 12 Third,
and on the perceived shortcomings of the oversight and there has been a disturbing lack of transparency with
enforcement mechanisms that were selected. 8 At the respect to the Privacy Commissioner’s compliance initia-
time, there was little in the way of findings by the Com- tives. This has been most evident with the all but cate-
missioner and nothing from the Federal Court. 9 That is gorical refusal to reveal the names of complaint respon-
no longer the case; by the end of 2003, the Commis- dents, 13 which has a number of unfortunate results. It
sioner had concluded over 250 complaint investiga- greatly undercuts the instructive value that complaint
tions10 and a number of complaints had proceeded to investigations might have, it deprives compliant institu-
†M.A., LL.B., LL.M., Manager of the Freedom of Information Office, Ontario Ministry of Labour. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the
author and are not intended to represent those of the Ministry of Labour. I am grateful to Murray Long who generously shared a number of his files with me































































114 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
tions of the recognition they deserve, it unjustly rewards from a compliance perspective is another matter. Not
non-compliant parties, it penalizes consumers who are only are there significant problems associated with com-
unable to make informed privacy decisions, it prevents plaint-based enforcement systems in general, 19 but there
the market from rewarding or penalizing organizations is good reason to think that they may be exacerbated in
based on the public’s awareness of privacy practices, and a privacy setting. A brief consideration of these issues is
it makes it extremely difficult to assess not only the helpful to understand more fully the implications of
extent of compliance with the PIPEDA, but also the relying primarily on a complaint-based approach to pri-
effectiveness of the Commissioner’s office in promoting vacy compliance.
compliance. Finally, uncertainty is becoming a central It is not always fully appreciated that in complaint-feature of oversight and enforcement of the PIPEDA. based enforcement, complaint resolution becomes theWhile this stems in part from unresolved issues such as primary vehicle through which the oversight agencyQuebec’s constitutional challenge, ‘‘substantially similar’’ develops policy. Agency policy arises from the accumula-determinations concerning provincial private-sector pri- tion of adjudicatory rules that are developed in thevacy statutes, 14 and the uncertainty about whether prov- course of resolving specific disputes. This means thatinces such as Ontario will introduce their own private- there are two aspects of complaint-based policy develop-sector privacy legislation, 15 it also derives from the Pri- ment that deserve attention. The first consideration isvacy Commissioner’s compliance strategies. The pro- the nature of the process that produces the rules thatnounced emphasis on complaint resolution means that coalesce into agency policy, and the second concern isthere will not be a full understanding of the nature of the rules themselves and how they are communicated tothe PIPEDA regime until there has been a comprehen- the wider community.sive treatment of the Act’s provisions at the appellate
level of the Federal Court. As a result, for quite some From a process perspective, complaint resolution
time, complainants will be unclear about their prospects tends to be driven by the parties to the dispute rather
for success, the Commissioner’s office cannot be confi- than by the oversight agency. As a result, the agency’s
dent about the directions it has charted, and organiza- agenda and policy development become both reactive
tions will be confused about the nature and extent of and dependent, dictated primarily by the nature of the
their privacy obligations. complaints that are advanced. Moreover, there is a real
danger that complaint-based systems of enforcementThis article will consider these four problems in
may not function at all if individuals fail to complain orgreater detail and will assess the extent to which they are
if the complaints are of poor quality. 20 Second, the com-primarily structural, in the sense that they are the result
plaint resolution process will be confined largely to theof previous legislative choices, or are more the product of
parties to the dispute. In many instances, they will con-compliance strategies adopted by the Commissioner’s
trol how the issues are framed and what information isoffice.
placed before the oversight agency. There is a strongTo the extent that they result from the former, the likelihood that this will result in a narrowing of issuespossibilities for change are limited, aside from a full over- and information under consideration, which may nothaul of the PIPEDA. However, if they are the product of advance the interests of the regulated community atpolicy choices in the Commissioner’s office, one can be large. 21 Third, policy development that occurs by way ofmore sanguine. The appointment of a new Commis- complaint resolution can be both costly and unfair tosioner provides a distinct opportunity for a change in the wider community. It is costly because it results indirection, signs of which are already clearly in evidence. 16 retrospective rule changes that affect not just the imme-The enactment of provincial statutes that satisfy the diate parties to the complaint, and it is unfair becausePIPEDA’s ‘‘substantially similar’’ test could also drive most of the affected parties will not have had an oppor-change at the federal level, and here, too, there have been tunity to influence the outcome. And finally, evenhints that this could occur. 17 Whether the opportunities though lack of complaints can be an issue, complaint-for change are realised will be pivotal if there is to be based enforcement systems are also particularly suscep-effective privacy protection throughout the private tible to overload. 22 This can result in delay for complain-sector. ants, uncertainty for the wider community, and resource
allocation issues for the oversight agency.
Complaint-based enforcement can also be criticizedResolving Complaints — Promoting
in terms of the rules that it generates. First, the narrowingCompliance? of issues that tends to occur in complaint-based systems
olin Bennett has noted that the PIPEDA ‘‘gives the arguably produces informational deficiencies thatC impression that the most important responsibilities undercut the substantive foundation for complaint-
of the Commissioner . . . relate to complaints investiga- based rules. Second, complaint-based rules are not
tion and redress.’’ 18 In fact, it is clear that complaint always clearly stated, frequently buried in or qualified by
resolution is at the heart of the PIPEDA’s approach to the particular facts of the case. Third, agency policy as a






























































Three Years Under the PIPEDA: A Disappointing Beginning 115
dense jurisprudence that may be anything but accessible information management practices (unless it believes
to the wider community. And when the rules change that a practice that has been implicated is consistent
through complaint resolution, the result may be ‘‘wealth with industry-wide standards), 28 and the oversight
transfers’’ 23 affecting the losing party and the broader agency will want to manage the scope of the issues
community as well. In short, complaint-based rules often under review given the demand on its resources and the
make it difficult for many parties to plan their behaviour pressure to close files in a timely manner.
with a clear understanding of what their obligations may
Some of the factors that force a narrowing of thebe.
issues under consideration in a privacy context also con-
The general criticisms of complaint-based enforce- tribute to the lack of visibility that often attaches to the
ment systems apply with particular force to privacy com- results of privacy investigations. For example, the Privacy
pliance, several warranting special mention. First, there is Commissioner has relied almost exclusively on fully
good reason to think that the effectiveness of complaints anonymized summaries of complaint-investigation
as an enforcement mechanism is greatly undermined in results after initial indications that investigation results
a privacy context because many individuals who may be would not be released at all. 29 However, to the extent
affected by problematic privacy practices never become that complaint investigations are used by privacy com-
aware of the misuse of their personal information. Most missioners as vehicles for establishing and communi-
individuals will have no idea that information con- cating privacy rules, limiting their availability under-
cerning them may have been improperly shared within mines their effectiveness, a point clearly recognised by
or between organizations and, therefore, will never be in British Columbia Commissioner David Loukidelis, who
a position to make a complaint. 24 Where an improper has already announced that he intends to make com-
use of personal information does come to an individual’s plaint investigation reports issued under the Personal
attention, it still may be difficult to identify the respon- Information Protection Act available in their entirety. 30
sible party. 25 For example, problems arising from erro-
Given both the general and the privacy-specific con-neous credit information may be difficult to trace back
cerns with complaint-based enforcement, there have toto the source. And in many instances where the impact
be serious reservations about the extent to which over-of an improper privacy practice is in the nature of a
sight and enforcement of the PIPEDA relies on com-minor annoyance rather than a serious, quantifiable
plaint resolution. Not only does the Act clearly revolveharm, it may not seem worth the individual’s time and
around the investigation and adjudication of complaints,effort to file a formal complaint, even though the cumu-
but enforcement responsibilities were assigned to twolative effect of the practice may be significant when
bodies that were heavily complaint-oriented in focus: thenumerous individuals are affected in a similar manner.
Federal Court by design but the Privacy CommissionerAll of these factors reduce the effectiveness of privacy
by choice, long viewed by leading privacy advocates as acomplaints as a mechanism for advancing privacy com-
primarily reactive, complaint-driven body. 31 And underpliance.
Commissioner Radwanski, the office’s complaint orien-
While a failure to complain may undermine the tation intensified with an emphasis on ‘‘building num-
effectiveness of complaint-based privacy compliance, bers’’ 32 in order to support requests for resources, a con-
there is also the converse problem that the system may cern that was reflected in the inflation of complaint
become overloaded by complaints that are idiosyncratic numbers by including non-jurisdictional findings and
or frivolous. As a result, even though they do not raise relatively minor failures to comply with the 30-day time
issues of systemic interest, they still consume scarce limit for responding to requests for personal informa-
administrative resources. A review of the complaint tion. 33
investigations completed under the PIPEDA through the
Aside from the complaint orientation of both thefirst three years suggests that we may be seeing both of
statute and the oversight and enforcement bodies, thethese factors at play. Although relatively few complaints
PIPEDA establishes an extremely unwieldy complaintraising serious systemic issues have been filed by individ-
process that requires individuals to proceed first to theuals directly affected in a personal capacity, 26 there have
Commissioner’s office, and then to Federal Court if dis-been any number of complaints that appear relatively
satisfied with the outcome.trivial and perhaps even vexatious in nature. 27
It was suggested that complaint-based systems tend Given that the Commissioner can only make rec-
to confine both the issues and the information that are ommendations, even if satisfied that the legislation has
placed before the oversight agency. This is very much the been breached, and that remedial relief is confined to
case with privacy complaints. The personal nature of the court, the potential for cost and delay to complain-
some of the issues certainly contributes to this, with ants is significant. This is compounded by the fact that
issues frequently being framed narrowly to protect the an application to the court involves essentially a
complainant’s privacy. Often, complainants will want to rehearing on the merits. As was suggested by the Public
focus on their particular circumstances, the respondent Interest Advocacy Centre and the Consumer Association






























































116 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
the legislative regime can do so in the comfortable ited by the removal of identifiers. For example, a partic-
knowledge that only the most determined and finan- ular organization might be the subject of a number of
cially able individuals will pursue them in court’’. 34 In complaints that, considered separately, appear to be
addition to cost and delay to complainants, the PIPEDA’s simply inadvertent mistakes. However, viewed together,
complaint process also undercuts the precedent value of the picture might change and more critical conclusions
Commissioner’s findings, given that the Federal Court might be drawn with respect to the extent of the organi-
has ultimate responsibility for fleshing out the statute. zation’s concern for the careful management of personal
And because of the protracted complaint process that is information. 40
likely to discourage many complainants, it may be quite
It is both puzzling and frustrating that in a com-some time before we have a clear understanding of how
plaint-based system where precedent often plays a largethe PIPEDA’s provisions will be interpreted, a point that
role in deciding future cases and in informing the widerwill be considered at greater length. Suffice it to say that
community, the Commissioner’s office refuses to providethe PIPEDA’s complaint provisions invite prolonged
anything more than anonymised case summaries. Theuncertainty rather than providing necessary guidance to
reliance on complaint summaries prevents parties fromthe wider community.
obtaining a detailed understanding of the approach
taken by the Commissioner in individual cases, and the
problem is exacerbated by the refusal to link investiga-
Complaint Resolution — The tion findings to other cases involving similar issues,
including investigations involving the very same respon-Results Thus Far 
dent. 41 This seems to be an attempt by the Commis-iven the heavy reliance on complaint resolution, sioner’s office to ensure that its position concerning theG some comment is in order with respect to the com- identification of complaint respondents is not under-plaint investigations concluded in the first three years. mined, an issue that will be considered at greater length.What is immediately apparent is that a full and fair Unfortunately, the result is that investigation summariesassessment of the Commissioner’s findings is not pos- are far less useful than they could be, a point that wouldsible, given that the complete investigation results are be less important if complaint resolution was not viewednot available. The Commissioner’s office has chosen to by the Commissioner’s office as the primary vehicle forrelease short investigation summaries and, in all but one developing policy and promoting compliance.case, the summaries have been anonymised. That being
said, a review of the investigations concluded through The current emphasis on complaint resolution to
2003 indicates that in most cases, the conclusions are administer the PIPEDA is clearly grounded in the legisla-
supported by the facts and there are few results that tion and in the decision to rely on oversight and enforce-
might be viewed as contentious. 35 However, there is very ment bodies that were largely complaint-driven in out-
little substance to many of the summaries, and there are look, but the Commissioner’s enforcement strategies
a number of significant findings that deserve far more have reinforced complaint-resolution tendencies. At the
attention than they appear to have received. As a case in same time, aspects of these strategies have ensured that
point, a number of investigation summaries dealing with complaint resolution is far less effective than it might be.
significant workplace privacy issues provide little sense of A number of factors appear to be at work. The first is an
what considerations weighed most heavily in the out- overly cautious reading of the PIPEDA by the Commis-
come.36 If complaints are to serve as a meaningful way of sioner’s office in terms of what is permissible with
providing parties with direction and guidance, it is vitally respect to the identification of complaint respondents. 42
important that this information be made available. Second is an excessive concern that some leverage must
In assessing the PIPEDA’s first year, Colin Bennett be retained with respect to bad actors. 43 This clearly
expressed disappointment with the overall quality of the derives from the fundamental weakness of the
complaints that had been initiated. 37 A review of the 255 ombudsman model; given that an ombudsman can only
summaries through 2003 suggests that this is still a real recommend, this places a premium on the power of
concern. There are relatively few complaints that raise publicity that the Commissioner’s office has guarded as if
major systemic issues, and a number of those that do it were a precious commodity. The danger is that in
have been filed by advocates intentionally challenging reserving it for the most serious cases, it ends up never
particular practices such as the use of personal informa- being used. At the same time, some of the potential
tion for secondary marketing purposes. 38 However, it benefits of complaint investigations are lost. That being
may well be that in a complaint-focused system, this will said, these are matters that can be revisited and there is
be one of the few tools that can be employed to ensure already ample evidence that the new Commissioner is
that systemic issues are fully canvassed, there being the far more receptive to the concerns of the privacy com-
added advantage that the full investigation results may munity than was her predecessor. If so, there is the possi-
become available to the community at large. 39 The bility that the present emphasis on complaint resolution
majority of complaints continue to be very narrow in could be reduced and the policies that undermine its






























































Three Years Under the PIPEDA: A Disappointing Beginning 117
not acted upon.49 This would certainly appear to provideUsing the Entire Privacy Toolbox 
sufficient basis for proceeding under section 18. 50 How-
he oversight and enforcement thrust of the PIPEDA ever, it may mean that as with the power to publicize aT is clearly complaint-oriented, but that is by no respondent’s identity, the power to audit becomes one
means the only approach to privacy compliance contem- that is held in abeyance. If so, this would be unfortunate
plated by the legislation. Under section 24 of the Act, the given the value assigned to privacy audits by a number of
Commissioner is provided with some very significant privacy experts, Bennett and Flaherty in particular. 51
compliance tools, which include public education,
Finally, as should be clear by now, the power toresearch, and working with organizations to develop pri-
publicize has, with one exception, simply not been exer-vacy codes and guidelines. In addition, section 18
cised either in the context of the annual reports or in theauthorises the Commissioner to conduct an audit of an
reporting of individual complaint investigation findings.organization’s personal information practices where
And given that the audit power has not yet beenthere are ‘‘reasonable grounds to believe’’ that the organi-
employed, there has been no issue of publicity in thiszation is not complying with the Act. Finally, the Com-
context.missioner has the power of publicity, not only as a part
There are at least three significant concerns withof the annual report to Parliament, but also pursuant to
respect to the Privacy Commissioner’s seeming reluc-section 20, which allows for disclosure of an organiza-
tance to employ any compliance tools much apart fromtion’s personal information management practices where
complaint resolution. First, the Commissioner’s office isthe Commissioner ‘‘considers that it is in the public
short-changing itself because there is good reason tointerest to do so.’’
think that successful oversight and enforcement, particu-In the first three years under the PIPEDA, these tools
larly in a privacy context, depends upon utilising effec-were scarcely employed. In terms of the Commissioner’s
tively all of the available administrative tools. Second, thepowers under section 24, education was limited for the
price of overemphasizing complaint investigations is amost part to high-level speeches by Commissioner
neglect of proactive and systemic approaches that areRadwanski with little in the way of concrete direction; as
likely to be far more effective in terms of building inInterim Commissioner Marleau acknowledged, the
privacy from the ‘‘bottom up’’. 52 Third, the Commis-office was ‘‘reluctant to issue guidelines’’ even though it
sioner’s office is depriving itself of the opportunity torecognised an appetite for this within the regulated com-
engage the community, a step that is vitally important inmunity. 44 And, until very recently, 45 there was little
terms of engendering a vested interest in making theemphasis on PIPEDA-specific research; certainly nothing
legislation work. These three concerns overlap and inter-that was made publicly available. Perhaps of most impor-
relate, but each merits special attention.tance, there is no evidence of any concerted effort to
With respect to the failure to utilise all the oversightactively engage the regulated community with respect to
and enforcement mechanisms the legislation provides,the development of guidelines or codes of practice. This
Colin Bennett has noted that ‘‘it is not entirely clear thatpoint is made abundantly clear by Case Summary #167,
the OPC fully recognises that successful privacy protec-an important complaint dealing with consent to disclose
tion depends on using the entire repertoire of possiblepersonal information for marketing purposes. After
policy instruments for the protection of privacy.’’ 53 Ben-making a number of specific recommendations to
nett has always been a strong proponent of using theimprove the respondent organization’s consent proce-
‘‘entire toolbox’’, especially some of the ‘‘softer’’ privacydures, the Commissioner then recommended that the
tools such as education, given its importance in pro-respondent present those same recommendations to the
ducing ‘‘organizational change and learning’’. 54 There areCanadian Marketing Association and ‘‘convey his expec-
other privacy commissioners who share Bennett’s views.tation that all CMA members will quickly adopt them’’
For example, Ontario’s Information and Privacy Com-(emphasis added). 46 One might have expected that the
missioner, Ann Cavoukian, has actively encouraged aCommissioner would have been quick to seize a chance
variety of education and research initiatives involvingto interact directly with the broader community on an
other commissioners, other jurisdictions, and private-issue of significant import. Instead, the opportunity was
sector organizations. 55 She has also been an enthusiasticpassed up, and in a manner that could only serve to
advocate of innovative tools such as privacy-enhancingalienate rather than enlist the support of the CMA.47
technologies. And British Columbia’s Commissioner,With respect to the Commissioner’s section 18
David Loukidelis, has clearly advanced a strong case foraudit powers, they have not yet been used, the view
using a wide range of tools, such as guidelines andbeing that, as yet, there have not been sufficient grounds
advance rulings to assist and educate the community. 56to do so. 48 Given some of the investigations that have
been concluded, especially in 2003, there have to be Although the Privacy Commissioner’s office has
some concerns about what it may take to trigger an demonstrated little interest in many of the compliance
audit. It is now apparent that there are repeat ‘‘offenders’’ instruments that might complement complaint resolu-
including one case in which the Commissioner tion, there have been some recent signs that this may
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from the accumulation of findings in response to com-indicated that there was greater willingness to consider
plaints. Surely, the staff of the Commissioner’s office and thethe development of guidelines, a shift that appears to be
Direct Marketing Association (DMA) can get together tofully supported by Commissioner Stoddart. 57 Another figure out a consistent interpretation of the rules for notifi-
particularly positive indication of change in the Com- cation, consent, access and so on. 63
missioner’s office is the announcement of the formation
The use of collaborative processes to produce ‘‘rules’’ toof an advisory panel of outside experts. 58 The mere fact
guide the wider community is an approach with consid-that it includes David Flaherty is significant, given his
erable merit, 64 but there are reasons that can disinclineviews on the importance of tools such as site visits and
some agencies from proceeding in this manner. First ishis critical reservations concerning the value of com-
cost, particularly as one moves towards more full-blownplaint investigations. 59 There is also the recently
consultative processes. Second, even though proponentsannounced Contributions program,60 designed to pro-
often laud the benefits of consultation-based guidelines,mote privacy-focused research. Finally, Commissioner
it can be difficult to demonstrate clearly the benefits. InStoddart’s demonstrated willingness to engage and col-
fact, there may even be a perverse disincentive at work.laborate with the privacy community provides a strong
From a narrow, short-term perspective, it may be in anindication that her office may be prepared to be more
agency’s interest to focus on complaints. They are farcreative with respect to the means by which it promotes
more measurable and can be used to demonstrate bothcompliance with the PIPEDA.
effectiveness and the need for resources. Conversely, if
In addition to failing to draw on all of the compli- proactive initiatives are too successful and, as a result,
ance tools that are at the Privacy Commissioner’s dis- reduce the number of complaints filed, this may serve to
posal, the reliance on complaint resolution also means undercut the agency’s position. Finally, there is an issue
that there is a neglect of proactive and systemic of style; participative processes depend on open, con-
approaches to privacy compliance. As discussed already, structive dialogue, and where this is absent, the likeli-
complaint investigations are inherently reactive, which hood of engaging the community is reduced. 65
has an impact on how an oversight body can develop
Nonetheless, there are indications that a number ofpolicy. Although there may be some latitude to expand
commissioners are receptive to collaborative approaches.the scope of a complaint investigation, this will be lim-
David Loukidelis is probably in the forefront in terms ofited by other considerations; in particular, statutory time
advocating persuasively for the use of guidelines andlimits. 61 And even though a complaint investigation may
rulings informed by community participation. 66 And, asbe widened, there is still a dependence on the actual
noted, Ann Cavoukian’s office has worked with acomplaints that are brought forward. Without ‘‘quality’’
number of private-sector parties on initiatives designedcomplaints, the oversight body may have no opportunity
to provide guidance and assistance to the community,to explore systemic concerns, even if it is inclined to do
the best example being its recent collaborative effortso.
with the CMA on the application of fair informationAs noted, the PIPEDA does provide the Commis- principles to customer relationship managementsioner with a number of tools that involve approaches (CRM). 67 Finally, there are suggestions that that the fed-that are proactive, systemic, or both. The two most eral Privacy Commissioner could move in this directionimportant are assisting organizations to develop privacy as well. As noted earlier, there now appears to be acodes or guidelines and the power to conduct section 18 recognition that the community wants direction andaudits. The former is clearly a tool that is both proactive guidance from the Commissioner’s office, and there areand systemic in outlook. The latter is systemic in nature, indications that this may be forthcoming. Of particularalthough it is triggered largely by reactive considerations note is Commissioner Stoddart’s recent speech to thein that the Commissioner must have some basis for CMA in which she referred explicitly to working asbelieving that the legislation is not being complied with, ‘‘partners’’ to ‘‘eliminate practices that do not respect faira determination that as a practical matter is most likely information principles’’. 68 On its own, this might notto arise from complaint investigation findings. As indi- seem especially noteworthy, but compared with thecated already, neither of these tools has been employed approach of Commissioner Radwanski evidenced inby the Commissioner’s office to date. Case Summary #167, discussed earlier, it does signify an
With respect to the development of codes or guide- important change in tone and direction.
lines, there is already an extremely solid foundation for
Finally, there is the issue of engaging the broaderproceeding further, given the extent to which voluntary
community in the sense of enlisting its support incodes have taken root in Canada. Bennett, who has long
ensuring that the legislation works. It has been said ofemphasized the general importance of the Canadian
James Landis, perhaps the leading proponent of thecode-building experience, 62 has suggested in the context
effectiveness of the administrative process69 and one ofof the PIPEDA that:
its most successful architects and administrators, that he
. . . there is clearly a need for greater collaboration with those fully appreciated the importance of using all availableassociations who have already developed codes of practice. It
tools to ensure that all parties had a vested interest inseems rather counterproductive for rules about direct-mar-






























































Three Years Under the PIPEDA: A Disappointing Beginning 119
noted ‘‘. . . Landis persistently emphasized the necessity with respect to disclosure of compliance-related data. 74
of using all the incentives potentially inherent in the However, with Commissioner Radwanski’s departure,
industry [securities regulation] to give every person matters appear to be changing and there is clear evi-
involved — executive, accountant, broker, banker — a dence that a more far more open environment has
stake in helping to enforce the law’’. 70 emerged. 75 That being said, on the issue of identifying
complainant respondents, there has been no movement,There are positive signs that a number of privacy
even though Commissioner Stoddart has been stronglycommissioners appreciate the need to engage the com-
urged to reconsider the refusal to do so. 76munity in collaborative compliance-related initiatives.
For example, Commissioner Loukidelis has said, ‘‘. . . it is
The Commissioner’s office appears to have threecrucial to the law’s success that the oversight body be
main objections to the suggestion that complaint respon-constantly in touch with and open to approaches by all
dents should be named. First, the Commissioner’s officeaffected constituencies. Regulators, after all, do not have
has resisted naming names because it does not feel that ita monopoly on expertise or wisdom, so ongoing input
should be in the business of ‘‘punishing’’ organizations. 77from those involved is a good thing’’. 71
Second, it has argued that the power of publicity needs
An excellent example of enlisting community par- to be reserved for the most serious cases of non-compli-
ticipation in support of the compliance undertaking is ance. 78 Third, it has claimed that the wording of sec-
the collaboration between the CMA and Ontario’s Infor- tion 20 of the PIPEDA does not allow for the identifica-
mation and Privacy Commissioner with respect to cus- tion of organizations in all cases and that the
tomer relationship management. As the joint CMA-IPC determination of the ‘‘public interest in disclosure’’ must
paper concludes: be done on a complaint-by-complaint basis. 79 Before
Businesses should view privacy as a tool for ensuring that considering the case that can be made for identifying
CRM initiatives succeed. This can be achieved by building complaint respondents, several comments are in orderfair information practices into CRM, with a particular
with respect to the reasons advanced by the Commis-emphasis on being open and transparent with customers. In
sioner’s office for limited disclosure.short, privacy is good for CRM and can help companies to
gain a competitive advantage in the marketplace by
building strong customer relationships based on a founda- First, the notion that publicity can be equated with
tion of trust. 72 punishment is highly questionable. It only makes sense if
And a similar theme was expressed by Commissioner the starting assumption is that identities should normally
Stoddart when she urged the CMA to work with her to be protected, with disclosure the exception. However,
eliminate marketing practices that harmed the CMA and there has been no principled argument advanced to sup-
its members because they did not adhere to recognised port that proposition. 80 Aside from that, the direct corre-
privacy principles. 73 lation between publicity and punishment is not sustain-
able. Properly speaking, publicity is more aboutIn short, there now seems to be a much a greater
informing the wider community and this, of course, mayappreciation of the need for privacy commissioners to
have consequences, both positive and negative, forrely on all of the privacy tools that are at their disposal, to
affected organizations. Subsequent consumer choicesplace more emphasis on approaches to compliance that
may have an adverse impact, but characterizing this asbuild in privacy at the front end from the bottom up,
punishment misstates the issue. Moreover, as should beand to engage the broader community by convincing
readily apparent, in many cases, publicity will be to ankey participants that they have a vested interest in
organization’s benefit where its compliance efforts aremaking the legislation work. The most encouraging
praised by the Commissioner. 81developments are at the federal level where previously
just the opposite had been the case. That being said, one
With respect to the suggestion that the power ofmust be cautiously optimistic because there are some
publicity must be reserved for the most serious cases ofstill some issues where change is not yet evident. A good
non-compliant behaviour, this is really little more than aexample is the identification of complaint respondents,
candid admission that an ombudsman is severely con-to which we now turn.
strained in terms of the leverage it can assert with respect
to non-compliant actors. Rationing the use of a scarce
asset to address this shortcoming may actually beNaming Names counterproductive in the long-run, aside from the other
ntil recently, many of the Privacy Commissioner’s costs it entails. Between a policy of publicizing a respon-U activities with respect to enforcement of the dent’s identity in most situations and one holding out
PIPEDA were not as transparent as they might be. From the mere possibility of disclosure if the conduct is suffi-
the outset, the Commissioner’s office all but refused to ciently egregious, it is not hard to decide which would
disclose the names of complaint respondents and would have the greater deterrent effect. 82 The choice becomes
only release complaint investigation summaries, having even more one-sided when one factors in general com-
contemplated initially not releasing any investigation munity awareness that, in practice, the standard for dis-
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Finally, the suggestion that a broader disclosure sible. Second, it is only fair that organizations that are
policy is simply not mandated by the language of the complying with the legislation have their efforts
PIPEDA is not compelling. There appears to be a leap in recognised. 86 Third, it is unfair to allow non-compliant
logic where the Commissioner’s office reads the public organizations to shield themselves behind anonymized
interest standard in section 20 to require a case-by-case reports.
consideration. Quite simply, this seems to be an unnec-
With respect to market efficiency, it has always beenessarily constricted view of the scope of the section 20
argued that markets function best when consumers arepowers. One may grant that the wording of section 20
fully informed. When they lack critical information, theycontemplates something less than disclosure in every
cannot make informed choices. Linked to this is the ideacase, but that does not mean that the public interest
that informed choices will reward organizations thatmust be read to mean only in the most exceptional
invest in privacy protection. This in turn will encouragecircumstances — which is definitely the result under
other organizations to make similar investments. Con-current practice. In that respect, it is extremely difficult
versely, non-compliant organizations will be penalized toto understand how the public interest test for identifying
the extent that informed consumers elect to shift theircomplaint respondents could only be satisfied in one out
business to organizations that have privacy-friendly prac-of the 255 case summaries issued for the first three years.
tices.In addition, the Commissioner’s office does not appear
to have made any attempt to develop criteria to flesh out
Anonymized reports also undermine compliancethe public interest test, 83 and here there is considerable
efforts. On one hand, they discourage complianceroom for movement given that some of those pushing
because non-compliant firms are able to avoid criticalfor greater disclosure recognise that identifying com-
scrutiny. When experience shows that organizations areplaint respondents in every instance is not essential. 84 A
almost never identified, the most intransigent can carrycertain number of complaints simply do not raise issues
on reasonably secure in the knowledge that the publicof particular concern to the broader community, and
will remain unaware that their privacy practices are defi-publicizing in these circumstances would produce min-
cient. Perhaps just as troubling is that in grey areas, ano-imal returns. There might also be situations in which
nymity may encourage some organizations to take pri-disclosure of the organization’s identity might compro-
vacy-invasive risks rather than erring on the side ofmise a complainant’s privacy rights. After that, however,
privacy protection. The converse problem is that thethere are a number of situations in which disclosure
public does not have access to valuable informationwould be very much in the public interest. Examples
about exemplary practices. Aside from the benefits thatinclude complaints having broad systemic implications
ought to accrue to such organizations, other organiza-(e.g., opt-out policies), complaints involving repeat
tions are being denied an opportunity to study and applyoffenders, including failures to respond to previous rec-
what are recognised to be best practices. This is especiallyommendations, and investigations that reveal ‘‘exem-
important if the oversight agency itself is reluctant toplary’’ 85 practices on the part of respondent organiza-
provide specific guidance to the community.t ions .  More  pre fe rab le  would  be  a  genera l
acknowledgment that the public interest favours greater
Finally, it is almost impossible to make informeddisclosure, especially in the context of a new regime
assessments about how the system is functioning whenwhere the community is looking for guidance, but there
investigation findings are anonymised. For example, evenis considerable room to develop a set of public interest
though there are now over 100 investigations involvingcriteria that would permit much broader disclosure than
banks, we have no idea how the different banks com-occurs presently. This takes us to the positive case for
pare. We do not know to what extent the complaints aredisclosure.
distributed evenly across the banking sector, or whether
The argument for greater disclosure of the identity there are some particularly poor performers with
of complaint respondents has a number of strands that numerous complaints. One senses that the latter may be
can be grouped around four main themes: fairness, the case, but confirmation is lacking. 87 One can only
market efficiency, promoting compliance, and accounta- expect this to become more of a problem as complaint
bility and oversight. Some of these arguments overlap findings with respect to the provincially regulated private
and it is possible to frame an issue in a variety of ways. sector begin to appear. Anonymised reports also prevent
For instance, access to information can be considered as one from making fully informed assessments of the
an issue of fairness, as a market efficiency question, as a Commissioner’s findings. For example, where an organi-
compliance concern, and as a matter of oversight and zation’s privacy policies are in issue, knowing which
accountability. organization is involved would give others a much better
From a fairness perspective, there are several pro- sense of the basis for the Commissioner’s findings. This
positions that can be advanced. First, as a matter of fair- in turn would allow for a more informed critique of the
ness, consumers should be entitled to make well- Commissioner’s handling of complaints, something that
informed decisions on matters affecting them, which at this point is hampered by anonymity on one hand
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In short, the Privacy Commissioner’s policy with which the Federal Court will have an opportunity to
respect to the identification of complaint respondents consider the legislation. In addition, the Federal Court
lacks a strong, principled underpinning, and arguments process itself invites delay, especially since definitive rul-
advanced in support of it do not stand up to scrutiny. ings on the PIPEDA’s provisions will undoubtedly
Moreover, there are a number of compelling arguments require a determination by the Federal Court of Appeal.
that favour much greater disclosure, even if that does not Taken together, these factors ensure that for quite some
lead to the identification of the respondent in every case. time there will be considerable uncertainty about the
However, the indications from the Commissioner’s precise nature of the obligations that regulated parties
office thus far suggest that if there is to be any movement have under the Act. Several additional comments about
in this area, it is unlikely to be dramatic. 88 But at the each of these points is necessary.
same time, one also senses that Commissioner Stoddart With respect to the general nature of many of theis cognizant of the limitations arising from the statutory PIPEDA’s provisions, there has always been debate aboutframework, both in terms of the language of section 20 the extent to which legislatures can and should defineand with respect to the reliance on a ombudsman model standards more clearly. 92 That being said, the decision tofor oversight and enforcement, and this may well be rely on the CSA Model Code with respect to many of theaddressed in the report she will make in 2006 as part of PIPEDA’s substantive requirements means that the lan-the five-year review of the legislation. 89 However, there guage used is more general and open-ended than wouldwill be a great deal of water under the bridge by then, often be the case. This takes on greater significance if theand one senses that if there is not more significant move- primary means for fleshing out these standards is by wayment on this issue, it will become all too apparent that of complaint adjudication. Not only will this be time-the legislation has little bite. consuming, but it will be haphazard, being dependent
on the nature and the number of complaints that are
received. If the complaints are few and the issues narrow,
this will greatly circumscribe the Commissioner’s abilityInterpreting PIPEDA — How Long
to generate useful jurisprudence. But even if complaintsWill it Take? 
do provide the Commissioner with the opportunity to
ith any new legislative regime, some time will be flesh out the statutory obligations, the directions chartedW required for the agency entrusted with oversight will remain highly uncertain until the Federal Court has
and enforcement to flesh out the statutory language. It weighed in. 93 This takes us to the second point, which is
may accomplish this primarily through the adjudication the unusual manner in which the PIPEDA has assigned
of complaints, or in conjunction with development of responsibility for interpreting the Act’s provisions.
guidelines and rules, if the legislation permits. In most
As noted already, the Privacy Commissioner is giveninstances, primary responsibility for interpreting the leg-
primary responsibility for most activities relating to over-islation’s core provisions resides with the agency, subject
sight and enforcement of the legislation. This includesof course to judicial review, the scope of which will
public education, research, and working with organiza-depend on the extent of privative protection that has
tions to develop codes and guidelines that promote com-been extended to the agency’s decisions. However, until
pliance with the Act. Implicit in this is that the Commis-the statutory language has been applied to specific situa-
sioner’s office will be the repository of significant privacytions, regulated parties will be uncertain about the scope
expertise. However, when it comes to defining theof their obligations and may delay investing resources in
meaning of the Act’s core provisions, the Commissionercompliance until the extent of those obligations is clear.
is relegated essentially to the sidelines. Although a com-Under the PIPEDA, the element of uncertainty that plainant must first go to the Commissioner, enforce-results from the inevitable delay in resolving such funda- ment, like interpretation of the legislation, is ultimatelymental issues is exacerbated tremendously by a number with the Federal Court. In fact, an application to theof factors. First is the very general nature of many of the court involves a full review on the merits with no specialPIPEDA’s provisions, in particular the fair information significance being attached to the Commissioner’s inves-practices that have been imported as part of the Cana- tigation findings. 94dian Standards Association’s Model Code. Second, even
though the Privacy Commissioner is the primary over- Even in a regime where responsibility for interpreta-
sight body on an ongoing basis, responsibility for tion is given to the oversight agency and the courts pur-
defining the statutory language resides essentially with port to defer to the agency’s expertise, there is consider-
the Federal Court, 90 which will be involved, at most, able room for intrusive judicial review to reshape the
infrequently. Third, the PIPEDA puts in place a contours of the legislation. 95 Under the PIPEDA, this is
mandatory two-step complaint process that requires the magnified many times over, given that there a complete
complainant to obtain a report from the Commissioner separation between the accumulation of privacy-related
before being able to proceed to Federal Court. By expertise and the interpretation of the legislative stan-
increasing cost91 and delay, the process is likely to dis- dards. Although the former ought to guide the latter, the
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choose to defer to some extent to the Commissioner’s course, the Commissioner’s office has no choice but to
investigation findings, but this is not required and is by move ahead with its compliance initiatives. The problem
no means a given. 96 The result is that decisions ema- is that it cannot do so in confidence with the result that
nating from the Federal Court could easily undermine its authority over non-compliant parties and its leader-
the Commissioner both in terms of complaint resolution ship with respect to the wider community are severely
and broader compliance-focused initiatives. This leads to undermined.
uncertainty all around, for complainants, for the Com-
missioner’s office, and for the regulated community.
Finally, the mandatory two-step complaint process Conclusion 
aggravates matters by increasing the likelihood of cost
and delay for complainants. The Commissioner has up rom the very outset, the approach to oversight and
to one year in which to issue a report dealing with a F enforcement of the PIPEDA has been complaint-
complaint. If at that point the complainant is not satis- focused. This was clear from the thrust of the statute and
fied with the outcome or if the respondent refuses to from the existing orientation of institutions charged with
implement the Commissioner’s recommendations, the oversight and enforcement. The emphasis on complaint
complainant can make an application to Federal Court. resolution was entrenched even further by strategic
However, as indicated already, this involves a full exami- choices made by the Privacy Commissioner’s office,
nation on the merits with the possibility of an appeal to while statutory provisions providing proactive, systemic
the Federal Court of Appeal. In practice, this means that compliance tools were scarcely employed. The result is
most complaints will not be resolved by the Federal that compliance has been driven by an approach that
Court in anything less than two years. A good example is many privacy experts question, while methods that are
provided by Case Summary #114, an important com- considered far more effective have been largely ignored.
plaint by a member of the Canadian Auto Workers In addition, the value of complaint resolution has been
(C.A.W.) about Canadian Pacific Railway’s use of elec- further undermined by the decision to protect the iden-
tronic surveillance in the workplace. A complaint was tity of complaint respondents.
filed with the Commissioner’s office in January 2002, As a result of a number of factors, cost and delay
and the Commissioner’s report was released in Jan- have now become significant considerations for com-
uary 2003. 97 Although the complaint was upheld, the plainants in particular, and uncertainty has become criti-
Commissioner’s recommendations were not imple- cally important for all parties. Although the initial deci-
mented and in February 2003, an application was made sions about oversight and enforcement impose structural
to Federal Court for a hearing on the matter. The appli- limits on the possibilities for change, there is consider-
cation was argued in April 2004, 14 months after the able room for movement with respect to the emphasis
proceeding was initiated, and a decision denying the the Commissioner’s office decides to place on systemic
application was issued in June 2004. Even with the ben- and proactive approaches to compliance. In this respect,
efit of union counsel, it still took over two years to get there are very strong signals that the Commissioner’s
the matter heard in Federal Court and an appeal would office will be placing far greater emphasis on education,
have prolonged matters even further. 98 While the C.A.W. guidance, and collaborative undertakings with provincial
may have both the resources and the interest in pursuing counterparts and with the wider community. 100 That
such a case, for most complainants this would be a being said, there is more that can be done, particularly to
daunting prospect. increase transparency with respect to the investigation of
Not surprisingly, at this point, there have been rela- complaints and the identification of organizations that
tively few applications to Federal Court and only three deserve to be criticized or emulated. Even so, there is still
cases decided on the merits. 99 At this rate, it could be a fundamental issue with the pervasive uncertainty that
years before we have a good sense of how the legislation flows from the decision to give ultimate responsibility
will be shaped by the Federal Court. This does not bode for interpretation and enforcement to the Federal Court.
well from a compliance perspective. Those organizations If matters do not improve, this should be a central point
that are not committed to complying with the legislation of concern in the review of the legislation that takes
will have ample opportunity to delay and discourage place two years hence. Revisiting this decision could
complainants. And, as indicated, the result is that fewer begin to address the PIPEDA’s critical oversight and
complaints will get decided by the Federal Court, enforcement shortcomings — flaws that have become all
thereby further delaying the interpretive process. Of too apparent.
Notes:
1 S.C. 2000, c.5. policy directions might change under his eventual successor. Murray Long
has noted: ‘‘Certainly the law will be interpreted differently under Ms.2 Not only did the circumstances surrounding Commissioner Radwanski’s
Stoddart and Ms. Black [the Assistant Commissioner], eroding the value ofresignation provide an unnecessary distraction with respect to the office’s
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World of Privacy Law’’ (2004) 1:4 Can. Privacy L. Rev. 40 [Interesting enforcement approaches. Both of these announcements reflect a willing-
Times].) ness to engage the broader privacy community in a constructive manner,
something that was notably absent during Mr. Radwanski’s tenure. Both3 As Murray Long has pointed out: ‘‘While the previous Parti Quebecois
announcements are available on the Commissioner’s Web site (http://government was adamantly opposed to PIPEDA and saw the Act as
www.privcom.gc.ca).eroding Quebec powers, it is a bit of a surprise that the Liberal govern-
ment has taken the same view — and left it until December 2003 to 17 For example, British Columbia’s Commissioner, David Loukidelis,
launch such a challenge’’. (Interesting Times, supra, note 2 at 41.) And, as announced late in 2003 that he would be releasing privacy investigation
Simon Chester has noted, ‘‘The uncertainty will also cast a pall on busi- reports issued under the Personal Information Protection Act in their
nesses which are only now starting to gear up for compliance with a law entirety and would be identifying complaint respondents. This type of
that may well be struck down’’. (‘‘PIPEDA Reference Raises Vital Constitu- development could begin to exert pressure on the federal Commissioner.
tional Questions’’ (2004) 1:5 Can. Privacy L. Rev. 55.) At the very least it will force the Commissioner’s office to be clearer
about the basis for refusing to provide more details with respect to4 As of January 1, 2004, the PIPEDA applied to the provincially regulated
complaint investigation outcomes. See ‘‘Thoughts on Private Sector Pri-private sector unless a province had enacted legislation that was deter-
vacy Regulation’’, a speech given at a privacy conference in Vancouver onmined to be ‘‘substantially similar’’ to the PIPEDA (s. 26(2)(b)).
November 24, 2003. It is available on the Commissioner’s Web site5 See ‘‘Protecting Personal Information in Canada’s Private Sector: The Price (http://www.oipcbc.org).
of Consensus Building’’ (2002) 27 Queen’s L.J. 609. 18 Supra, note 11, at 3.6 Section 14(1) provides that a complainant may apply to Federal Court 19 I have discussed these issues at length in an earlier article. See ‘‘Policy‘‘after receiving the Commissioner’s report’’.
Development by Labour Relations Boards in Canada: Is There a Case for7 The argument was that the weaknesses of the oversight and enforcement Rulemaking?’’ (2000) 25 Queen’s L.J. 479, in particular at 487-507.
mechanisms were the result of several factors. First, the government’s 20 Alasdair Roberts has referred to this as a ‘‘failure in co-production’’. Seepolicy objectives were vague and open-ended. Second, there was a failure
‘‘New Strategies for Enforcement of the Access to Information Act’’to ask penetrating questions at key points in the process and a lack of
(2002) 27 Queen’s L.J. 647, at 668.empirical and comparative analysis on some critical issues. Finally, the
government was committed to a light version of oversight and enforce- 21 James Landis strongly advanced this view in The Administrative Process
ment out of a concern that key organizations be kept onside. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951). As he put it: ‘‘The ultimate test
of the administrative [process] is the policy it formulates, not the fairness8 The argument with respect to the Privacy Commissioner was two-fold.
as between the parties of the disposition of a controversy on a record ofFirst, an ombudsman is an inherently weak model to base oversight and
their own making’’ (at 39).enforcement on, given that it is confined to making recommendations
that may be ignored. Second, the Privacy Commissioner’s office was 22 Roberts, supra, note 20, at 671.
already viewed as a reactive, complaint-focused body which was a concern 23 See R.S. Kauffman, ‘‘Politicization of NLRB Doctrine: Costs Imposed byif one did not view complaint resolution as the most significant tool for
Institutional Alternatives in the Administration of the NLRA’’ (1987) 4promoting compliance. With respect to the Federal Court, the argument
J.L. & Pol. 123 at 138.was that it was a generalist body that had no claim to privacy expertise
and its track record with respect to the handling of closely related access to 24 From the perspective of someone who has extensive experience adminis-
information issues gave cause for concern in terms of the development of tering privacy obligations within an institution, it seems that there are
consistent, privacy-sensitive jurisprudence. very few formal complaints largely because individuals simply won’t
know how information concerning them is being used. It is interesting to9 The paper was completed in mid-2001 when there were very few case
note that Ontario’s Information and Privacy Commissioner has estab-summaries issued by the Privacy Commissioner.
lished an expectation that institutions notify it when they become aware10 There were 255 case summaries issued through the end of 2003, that a privacy breach may have occurred. (See What to Do When a
although several involved re-issued factual findings. Privacy Breach Occurs; Guidelines for Government Organizations) There
is no doubt that this makes sense in terms of ensuring that problematic11 See, for example, Colin Bennett’s address to a privacy conference in
practices do come to light, but there are two significant concerns. First,Vancouver in March 2002 entitled ‘‘The First Year of the Personal Infor-
the policy has no statutory underpinning and relies on a good faithmation Protection and Electronic Documents Act: Was This the Way it
application by institutions. Second, the IPC’s practice on receiving aWas Supposed to Be?’’, available online at http://web.uvic.ca/~polisci/
notification that a privacy breach may have occurred is to open anbennett/research. As well, Michael Geist has written a number of critical
investigation file that is characterized as an IPC-initiated complaint. Onepieces in The Toronto Star. See, for example, ‘‘Name Names, or Privacy
has to wonder whether this practice won’t discourage the reporting ofLaw Toothless ’’ (November 17, 2003) [Name Names] and ‘‘Weak
potential privacy issues, given that investigation results will frequentlyEnforcement Undermines Privacy Laws’’ (April 19, 2004).
appear on the IPC’s Web site.12 The notion of a privacy toolkit is a predominant theme in Colin Ben-
25 As Daniel Solove has noted: ‘‘A person who begins receiving unsolicitednett’s work, as is the emphasis on employing all of the privacy tools that
marketing mail and email may have a clue that some entity has disclosedare available. Bennett has also suggested that ‘‘The recognition of the
her personal information, but that person often will not be able tocomplementarity of these privacy solutions is perhaps stronger in Canada
discover what entity was the culprit. ’’ See Privacy and Power: Computerthan in most other societies’’. (‘‘Adequate Data Protection by the Year
Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, (2001) 53 Stan. L. Rev.2000: The Prospects for Privacy in Canada’’ (1997) 11 Int’l. Rev. L.Comp.
1393, at 1444.& Tech. 79, at 86.)
26 For example, eight major complaints involving issues of systemic impor-13 The only instance in which the Privacy Commissioner’s office identified
tance were filed by the Public Interest Advocacy Centre. Although thea complaint respondent was in Case Summary #42 (Air Canada). How-
Case Summaries were anonymised, PIAC made the entire complaintever, other complaint respondents have been identified by complainants
investigation findings available on its Web site at http://www.piac.ca(e.g., Public Interest Advocacy Centre) or as a result of complaints pro-
(under ‘‘Privacy’’). The PIAC complaints are reported by the Privacyceeding to Federal Court.
Commissioner as Case Summaries #77–83 and #85.14 Commissioner Radwanski contributed significantly to the uncertainty
27 See, for example, Case Summaries #75, #113, and #136.with respect to the ‘‘substantially similar’’ issue by announcing very pub-
licly that, in his view, neither Alberta’s nor British Columbia’s draft 28 See, for example, Case Summary #39, dealing with a bank’s credit scoring
private-sector privacy bills would satisfy the test. After that, matters model that reflected industry practice, and Case Summary #167, where it
changed considerably and Industry Canada indicated that both pieces of was argued that the organization’s practices where consistent with
legislation would meet the test with proposed exemption notes pub- industry standards and with the Canadian Marketing Association’s pri-
lished in the Canada Gazette on April 10, 2004 (volume 138, no. 15). vacy code, even though the respondent acknowledged that the latter
‘‘lacked clarity’’.15 See Michael Geist’s article ‘‘Waffling Ontario Coming up Short on Pri-
vacy Law’’ in The Toronto Star, December 18, 2003. 29 As Colin Bennett has pointed out: ‘‘Initial press reports on how the new
16 Two early and very significant indicators of change were the Commis- commissioner would handle complaints under the PIPEDA suggested
sioner’s announcement on February 13, 2004 of the creation of an that he would not, as a matter of practice, publish the findings of his
external advisory committee to ‘‘provide expert advice on strategic direc- investigations. This prompted an open letter from a group of privacy
tions’’ and her letter to Commissioners David Loukidelis and Frank lawyers and advocates lamenting this decision and arguing that the nas-
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benefits of disclosure clearly outweigh confidentiality concerns. Whether 45 On June 1, 2004, the Commissioner’s office announced the launch of a
this pressure worked or whether initial reports were inaccurate, the office privacy research program to ‘‘ . . . support research into, as well as the
did begin a practice of publishing a summary of its findings with respect promotion of, the protection of personal information’’. See ‘‘Privacy Com-
to complaints and placing them on its web site.’’ See ‘‘The Privacy Com- missioner launches $200,000 contributions program’’, available on the
missioner of Canada: Multiple Roles, Diverse Expectations and Structural Commissioner’s Web site (http://www.privcom.gc.ca).
Dilemmas’’ (2003) 46 Can. Pub. Admin. 218, at 233. 46 It should be noted that it was the respondent who had first suggested
30 Supra, note 17. bringing the Commissioner’s recommendations to the CMA for discus-
sion, to which the Commissioner responded that the recommendations31 In previous interviews with the author, both Colin Bennett (March 22,
were ‘‘not for negotiation but rather for adoption’’.1999) and David Flaherty (March 19, 1999) expressed this view.
47 Contrast Commissioner Radwanski’s approach in Case Summary #16732 Assistant Commissioner Heather Black acknowledged this in an inter-
to that of Commissioner Stoddart in a recent speech to the CMA whereview with Murray Long on August 27, 2003 and again in an interview
she expressed a desire to work with the CMA as ‘‘partners’’. Her addresswith him on March 25, 2004. Interim Commissioner Marleau was also
to the CMA’s 2004 National Convention & Trade Show on May 4, 2004present at the first interview and Commissioner Stoddart, Assistant Com-
is available on the Commissioner’s Web site (http://www.privcom.gc.ca).missioner Raymond D’Aoust, and Director of Communications Anne-
Marie Hayden were in attendance at the second interview. Reported in 48 The author confirmed this point with the Commissioner’s office onPrivacyScan, March 25, 2004. May 12, 2004. It was the office’s view that as yet there had not been
33 For example, six non-jurisdictional findings were reported in the period sufficient grounds to conduct an audit.
while Commissioner Radwanski held office; none were reported after his 49 See Case Summary #176.departure. See Case Summaries #17, #89, #98, #109, #123, and #164.
Within that same period there were a number of complaints that dealt 50 One would think that cases involving significant issues, repeat offenders,
solely with the failure to comply with the obligation to respond to a and previous recommendations not followed would provide a more than
request for information within 30 days. In particular, see Case Summary sufficient basis for proceeding with an audit. However it appears that the
#112, where the respondent was but four days late in responding to the Privacy Commissioner’s office thinks that it is necessary to have a com-
request. plaint that itself raises systemic issues. (This view was expressed by the
Commissioner’s office (supra, note 48).) Given that one of the weaknesses34 Submissions to the Standing Committee on Industry, December 8, 1998.
of complaints is that they tend to be narrow, the result may be that35 As Murray Long has suggested ‘‘Many of these findings are irrefutable — complaints are unlikely to provide the foundation for an audit. However,that is, the findings are based squarely on facts and there is no doubt if complaints do not work as the trigger, what basis will there be forabout how PIPEDA was interpreted’’ (supra, note 2, at 40). That being concluding that an organization’s practices are not in compliance withsaid, there have been a few findings that have generated critical com- the Act?ment. Michael Geist was extremely critical of the result reported in Case
51 Both Bennett and Flaherty have been strong proponents of the value ofSummary #251, where a complaint that a supervisor had continued to
audits and expressed this in interviews with the author. Supra, note 31.read a confidential fax after being asked to stop was determined to be not
well-founded. See ‘‘Weak Enforcement . . . ’’, supra, note 11. Murray Long 52 This is an approach repeatedly emphasized by Colin Bennett, who haswas equally critical of the finding in Case Summary #237 where it was stressed that ‘‘compliance has to emerge as much from the bottom-up, asconcluded that an employee had impliedly consented to the disclosure of from the top-down’’ (supra, note 11, at 2).medical information to co-workers who had accompanied her to a med-
ical appointment. See PrivacyScan, May 12, 2004. The author agrees with 53 Ibid. at 4.
the criticisms expressed in each case. 54 Ibid. at 3.
36 See for example Case Summary #153, an important complaint about the 55 Most of these initiatives have resulted in papers that are available on theuse of data to monitor workplace performance, which was dismissed
IPC’s Web site. A recent initiative of particular note is the joint report bywith little consideration of the issues raised. Case Summary #220, which
the IPC and the Canadian Marketing Association entitled ‘‘Incorporatingraised similar issues, also is notably deficient in analysis of what are very
Privacy into Marketing and Customer Relationship Management’’,important workplace privacy issues.
released in May, 2004 and also available on the IPC’s Web site (http://37 Supra, note 11, at 5. www.ipc.on.ca).
38 For example, see the group of eight complaints filed by the Public 56 See ‘‘Thoughts on Private Sector Privacy Regulation’’, supra, note 17. See,Interest Advocacy Centre. Supra, note 26. as well, ‘‘Enforcing Private Sector Privacy — One Regulator’s Perspective’’,
39 PIAC made the findings with respect to the complaints it filed publicly a speech given to a privacy conference in Victoria on February 14, 2003.
immediately available, which proved to be extremely valuable. This pro- Both are available on the Commissioner’s Web site (http://
vided information concerning the identity of the complaint respondent, www.oipcbc.org).
the length of time it took to complete the investigations, and the detailed 57 This was clear from Murray Long’s interview with the Commissioner’sfindings, all of which was otherwise unavailable.
office on March 25, 2004 (supra, note 32) and it is reflected as well in the40 This is similar to the notion of ‘‘surface bargaining’’ in labour law. It is various fact sheets that are now being put out by the Commissioner’s
possible that a pattern of conduct may reveal a failure to bargain in good office.
faith even though none of the specific incidents viewed in isolation
58 Supra, note 16.would involve a breach of the good faith obligation.
41 See, for example, Case Summary #176. 59 With respect the value of site visits, see Flaherty’s paper, ‘‘How to do a
Privacy and Freedom of Information Act Site Visit’’, available on the B.C.42 This seems apparent from Murray Long’s interview with the Commis-
Commissioner’s Web site (http://www.oipcbc.org). Concerning Flaherty’ssioner and the Assistant Commissioners on March 25, 2004, where there
reservations about the value of complaints, see ‘‘Controlling Surveillance:was an insistence that the statute prevented the naming of names. When
Can Privacy Protection be Made Effective?’’ in P. Agre & M. Rotenberg,asked ‘‘So there will still be findings issued that do not have names in
eds., Technology and Privacy: The New Landscape (Cambridge: MITthem?’’, Assistant Commissioner Black responded ‘‘We can’t do that. The
Press, 1998) 167 at185.law doesn’t allow us to do that. The law has built in a public interest test’’
(supra, note 32). With respect, that greatly overstates the limitations that 60 Supra, note 45.
arguably may be imposed by section 20. 61 Subsection 13(1) of the PIPEDA requires the Commissioner to prepare an43 The author contacted the Privacy Commissioner’s office in March 2003 investigation report within a year of the complaint being filed.
with respect to its policy on the identification of complaint respondents
62 Bennett has suggested that ‘‘ . . . Canada has become the only country inand two rationales were given for the limited disclosure of names. First, it
the advanced industrial world that has begun seriously the process ofwas claimed that the Commissioner was not in the business of ‘‘pun-
promoting privacy protection from the bottom up . . . There are probablyishing’’ organizations. Second, it was suggested that the power to publi-
more privacy codes in Canada than in any other society, especially fromcize needed to be reserved for the most serious cases of non-compliance.
sectoral trade associations . . . Codes of practice are, and will continue to44 Mr. Marleau acknowledged this in an interview with Terry McQuay, the be, a feature of privacy protection policy in Canada’’ (supra, note 12, atPresident of Nymity, in September 2003. The interview was posted on 87).Nymity’s Web site (http://www.nymity.com/newsletter/sept/
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64 The author is a strong proponent of the value of rulemaking and has major regulatory policies. It must define the content of the public interest
discussed this in the context of labour relations (supra, note 19) and and seek to develop it in the cases that come before it. ’’ Ibid., at 262.
privacy protection (supra, note 5). 84 The PIAC letter urging the Commissioner to consider naming respon-
65 James Dorsey discussed this issue in an interview with the author with dents clearly accepted that in some instances there would be no value in
respect to the applicability of rulemaking in a labour relations context identifying the complaint respondent (supra, note 76).
(July 22, 1999). 85 See Case Summary #82 (Bank of Nova Scotia).
66 Supra, notes 17 and 55. See, as well, the bulletin issued by Commissioner 86 Michael Geist has argued that withholding names denies some organiza-Loukidelis entitled ‘‘Commissioner seeks input on new private sector
tions the ‘‘reputational benefit’’ that should flow from having good pri-privacy rules to come into effect January 1, 2004’’. Available on the
vacy practices (Name Names, supra, note 11). The author also discussedCommissioner’s Web site (http://www.oipcbc.org).
this and other reasons for naming names at a Federated Press Financial
67 Supra, note 55. Services Privacy Conference in Toronto on April 30–May 1, 2003 (‘‘Two
Years Under the PIPEDA: The Experience Thus Far and the Challenges68 Supra, note 47.
Ahead’’).69 Landis’s The Administrative Process (supra, note 21), first developed as a
87 For example, we know from PIAC’s disclosure that it was the Bank ofseries of lectures at the Harvard Law School in 1938, is considered to be
Nova Scotia that was commended in Case Summary #82 and that mightthe classic articulation of the administrative perspective.
give one reason to think its general privacy practices would be privacy70 See Prophets of Regulation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984) sensitive. We also know that the Royal Bank’s former Chief Privacyat 172. Officer Peter Cullen was very well-regarded and as a result we might also
71 Supra, note 56, at 5. expect a strong privacy orientation within that institution.
72 Supra, note 55. 88 The interview with Murray Long on March 25, 2004 strongly suggests
that if the Commissioner’s office insists on a case-by-case approach to the73 Supra, note 47.
public interest issue, even though there are now over 260 completed74 In March 2003, the author called the Privacy Commissioner’s office to investigations, change will be very slow in coming (supra, notes 32 and
obtain compliance-related information. Not only were the responses to 79).
my questions concerning the identification of complaint respondents
89 In the March 25, 2004 interview with Murray Long, Commissioner Stod-guarded but there was a flat refusal to provide any information about
dart noted ‘‘One of the things that we will of course be looking at in thewhether the audit power had been used at that point.
course of the next two years is how efficient an ombudsman framework75 In May 2004, I contacted the Commissioner’s office to ask about the use is for applying personal information protection principles in the commer-
of the audit power and received a prompt response confirming that it cial sector’’ (supra, note 32).
had not been used to date including a candid explanation about why
90 The recent decision in Eastmond v. Canadian Pacific Railway  (2004 FCthat was the case. That being said, there are still transparency issues. Aside
852) [Eastmond] made it clear that an application to the Federal Courtfrom the issue of whether complaint respondents should be identified,
resulted in a de novo hearing in which new evidence could be intro-the Commissioner’s office refuses to disclose the date when a complaint
duced. As Murray Long has noted ‘‘ . . . the Federal Court is the only venuewas filed. Of course this prevents the community from obtaining a full
where true legal clarity on PIPEDA interpretation is likely to emerge andunderstanding of how the complaint process is working. From the avail-
the only venue where significant breaches of PIPEDA can be addressedable evidence, there have to be concerns because it is clear that a number
. . . Despite the risk and burden of going to Court, the reality is that it isof complaints that we do have information on have taken a full year to
the only venue where privacy rights under PIPEDA can ultimately beinvestigate. This includes the group of PIAC complaints, Case Summary
enforced’’ (PrivacyScan, July 26, 2004, at 2-3).#112, discussed subsequently, and Case Summary #66 (Nancy Carter v.
Inter.net Inc.) 91 It has become clear that cost will be a very significant factor influencing
the number and the types of cases that proceed to Federal Court. In76 Michael Geist has written a number of articles dealing with the issue
Englander v. Telus (2003 FC 705) [Englander], the costs awarded against(supra, note 11) and the Public Interest Advocacy Centre also wrote to
the unsuccessful applicant were $11,906.41 and the applicant had arguedCommissioner Stoddart in December 2003 urging her to identify com-
his own case, thereby reducing the costs that most other applicantsplaint respondents. The PIAC letter and the Commissioner’s response are
would have incurred. As Murray Long has suggested, ‘‘ . . . every individualavailable on the PIAC Web site (http://www.piac.ca). The author also
who files an application with the Federal Court should prepare to acceptwrote to the Commissioner in January about the issue and received a
what could be very daunting legal fees, especially if they lose. Thus, it isdetailed response from Assistant Commissioner Black.
only ever likely to be those cases involving provable, significant and77 This was a repeated theme in speeches by former Commissioner Bruce egregious harm to an individual’s privacy interests and where companiesPhillips and it was embraced by Commissioner Radwanski as well. are intransigent that will likely ever be pursued by an individual at the
78 Supra, note 43. Federal Court. This may be exactly what the lawmakers intended. The
result, however, is that, by default, the Office of the Privacy Commis-79 In the interview with Murray Long on March 25, 2004 (supra, note 32),
sioner becomes the only venue where public policy issues concerningAssistant Commissioner Black, when asked whether ‘‘internal criteria’’
PIPEDA are ever likely to get a hearing’’ (‘‘Englander v. Telus — the Costwould be developed to guide the exercise of discretion with respect to
Award’’ in PrivacyScan, July 11, 2004).disclosure, responded: ‘‘I don’t know if we’ll develop a guideline where
we have meet all of the tests in each case. From a legal perspective, we 92 For example, Henry Friendly in a prominent series of articles in the
have to look at each case and say ‘What is the public interest here?’ That Harvard Law Review issued a plea for clearer standard-setting by Con-
is the test’’. However she did leave open the possibility that eventually gress. See ‘‘The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need For Better
there could be a ‘‘generic set of criteria’’. Definition of Standards’’, Parts I, II, and III, (1962) 75 Harv. L. Rev. 863,
1055, and 1263. However, Kenneth Culp Davis was dubious that clearer80 In the United States there has been serious consideration of the princi-
standards were possible and argued for the use of agencies’ rulemakingples at stake with respect to the use of publicity in an enforcement
powers to flesh out general standards. See Discretionary Justice: A Prelim-context. See, for example, Ernest Gellhorn’s article ‘‘Adverse Publicity by
inary Inquiry (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969).Administrative Agencies’’ (1973) 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1380. See, as well,
Michael Lemov’s article ‘‘Administrative Agency News Releases: Public 93 This is made clear by the recent decision in Eastmond (supra, note 90)
Information Versus Private Injury’’ (1968) 37 Geo. W.L. Rev. 63. where the Court dismissed an application that was based on a successful
complaint to the Privacy Commissioner.81 See, for example, Case Summaries #82, #168, #207, and #223.
94 In Eastmond, Justice Lemieux stated that ‘‘I do not accord any deference82 In Marver Bernstein’s classic, Regulating Business by Independent Com-
to the Commissioner’s findings of fact because I am satisfied the evidencemission, he put the matter succinctly: ‘‘Those who discover that viola-
before me is considerably different than that gathered by the Privacytions go undetected and unpunished will have little respect for the
Commissioner’s investigation’’ (supra, note 90, at para 123).commission and will violate regulations with impunity if it is to their
financial or commercial advantage’’. (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood 95 I have discussed this issue at length in the context of Ontario’s freedom of
Press Publishers, 1955 at 224.) information process. See ‘‘Deference in Name Only: Judicial Review of
83 Supra, note 79. Bernstein suggested that defining the public interest is Ontario’s Information and Privacy Commissioner’’ (1998) 20 Adv. Q. 304
one of the critical functions a regulatory agency needs to perform. As he and ‘‘Judicial Deference and Ontario’s Information and Privacy Commis-
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96 In Englander (supra, note 91), the Court did suggest that the Commis- complaint should be addressed through the grievance procedure, as was
sioner’s report was entitled to ‘‘some deference’’ but did not elaborate. (At held in L’Ecuyer v. Aeroports de Montreal (2003 FC 573).
para 39.) More recently, in Eastmond, (supra, note 90), the Court was 98 As of late August, 2004, an appeal had not been filed.prepared to ‘‘ . . . accord the Privacy Commissioner some deference in the
area of his expertise which would include appropriate recognition to the 99 The three decisions to date are Englander v. Telus (supra, note 91),factors he took into account in balancing the privacy interests of the
L’Ecuyer v. Aeroports de Montreal (supra, note 97), and Eastmond v.applicant and CP’s legitimate interest in protecting its employees and
Canadian Pacific Railway (supra, note 90).property’’. (At para 122.) Unfortunately, neither decision discusses in any
detail the nature of the Commissioner’s expertise which would attract 100 On May 18, 2004, Commissioner Stoddart spoke at a privacy session in
judicial deference. Toronto put on jointly by the Ontario and Canadian Bar Associations
97 I am grateful to C.A.W. counsel Lewis Gottheil, who supplied this infor- and stressed that public education, working with her provincial counter-
mation and also provided a very helpful discussion of some of the issues parts and other affected organizations, and eliciting feedback from the
that were argued, including the standard of review that is appropriate for affected community would be some of the major areas of focus for her
the Commissioner’s decisions and the question of whether this type of office in the months ahead.
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